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Abstract
We build a simple model of legal dualism in which a pro-poor legal reform, under certain conditions,
causes the conﬂicting custom to go some way toward producing the change intended by the legislator. It
then acts as a "outside anchor" that exerts a "magnet eﬀect" on the custom. We illustrate this insight
using examples on inheritance, marriage, and divorce issues in Sub-Saharan Africa and India. We also
characterize the conditions under which a moderate pro-poor reform is more eﬀective than a radical
reform.
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11 Introduction
1.1 The Issue of Legal Pluralism
How the modern state interacts with the custom is a key issue in most developing countries. The concept
of legal pluralism that is used to study such contexts refers, in its most general meaning, to a situation of
coexistence of several law systems (Merry 1988, Griﬃths 1986). In a more restrictive sense, it means the
simultaneous existence of a formal legal system of statutory laws with customary principles or informal rules.
The formal law may have as its objective either replacing or complementing the informal rule. In the latter
case, legal pluralism is seen as a permanent situation and the diﬀerent laws deal with separate matters: for
example, the formal law regulates commercial, criminal, or constitutional aspects of human life, while civil
and personal matters are governed by the local customary law. In the former case, where legal pluralism
is considered as temporary, substituting the formal for the informal law has two distinct rationales. In the
ﬁrst rationale, the formal law serves the purpose of codifying and making uniform the existing customary
rules and practices. In such circumstances, informal rules appear to be “the foundations on which formal
rules are built” (Knight 1992: 172, North 1990). In the second rationale, the formal law aims at bringing a
change that the custom inhibits. The formal and the informal laws are then in conﬂict.
Several problems arise when legal pluralism is intended to be temporary. First, there is an uncertainty
about which legal system - the formal one or the custom - applies in a particular context. As pointed out
by Knight (1992), the enactment of a new formal law alters the information about the equilibrium that the
rule seeks to produce and lays down sanctions against behavior prescribed by the old rule. Whether the
new formal law will replace the existing custom then depends on the ability of the new information and the
sanctions to change the existing expectations. There are various reasons why actors might not believe that
the formal law will be used. The expectations formed in the past may be too persistent to give way to new
ones. The new rule may be ambiguous, being subject to multiple interpretations that are sorted out through
the experience of time (Cooter 1991: 773). Finally, there is uncertainty whether the sanctions under the
new rule will actually be enforced (Knight 1992: 185-186, Fafchamps 2004: 29-30).
When the change in expectations does not take place because of these reasons, customary rules tend
to persist and formal laws destined to replace them remain ‘dead letter’. In the institutions-as-equilibria
paradigm, the new law is not recognized as an institution because a certain representation becomes an
institution only if the agents mutually believe in it. In other words, the new law must be a focal point in
order to replace the prevailing custom (Aoki 2001: 13, Greif 2006: 3-53, Basu 2000: 111-15).1 For instance,
laws which have been enacted in Sub-Saharan Africa with the aim of preventing excessive fragmentation of
1Note that the same type of problem may arise when a foreign statutory law is imported to replace an existing domestic
legislation. As argued by Berkowitz et al. (2003), the transplanting of formal law imported from abroad will not, alone, alter
the behavior of agents. The eﬀects of legal transplants depend on the acceptance and internalization of formal law (see, e.g.
Pistor and Wellons 1999, Pistor et al. 2003).
2rural lands— whether through inheritance or through land sale transactions— have never been enforced. This
is caused not so much by people’s ignorance of the law as by their widespread belief that it runs counter to
deeply entrenched customary principles (such as the rights of all male children to receive a portion of the
family land), and is therefore unlikely to be followed by others or to be backed by appropriate sanctions
(André and Platteau 1998). In countries where the law forbids brideprice payments (e.g., the Ivory Coast,
Gabon, Central African Republic), people continue to follow the custom thus ignoring this law (Ntampaka
2004: 128-30). In Peru, the new water law ("ley del agua") that prescribes fee payments by users of irrigation
water meets ﬁerce opposition from members of Andean communities. According to a deeply entrenched
custom, water is a communal good that should remain free.2
An alternative problem is that individuals enjoying an informational advantage may manoeuvre multiple
legal frameworks for their own beneﬁt (Moore 1978). A striking example of this manipulation concerns the
application of laws providing for formal land rights or titles. Experience with land registration and titling
schemes has shown that well-informed, powerful and educated individuals often succeed in manipulating the
customary law to claim large tracts of land that they then hasten to register under the freehold system of
tenure (Doornbos 1975: 60-73, Glazier 1985: 231, Barrows and Roth 1989: 8, Berry 1993, Platteau 2000:
165-68, Jacoby and Minten, forthcoming).
The general view that emerges from the literature on legal pluralism is thus rather pessimistic: except
in cases where the statutory law is grounded in customary rules, legal pluralism tends to produce neutral
or negative eﬀects (Chanock 1985, Lund 1996, 1998, Lund and Hesseling 1999, Mackenzie 1996). In this
paper, we challenge this view and try to establish the conditions under which legal pluralism and reform
in formal law produce positive eﬀects. We study the context in which certain laws are competing with the
custom. More precisely, the legislator aims at improving the lot of vulnerable sections of the population whose
interests are harmed by the custom (e.g. lower castes in India or women in strongly patriarchal societies).
In such a setting, we argue that legal pluralism can potentially be beneﬁcial because the enactment of the
modern law might drive the informal rule to evolve in the desired direction. In the assumed environment,
the statutory law is perfectly known to all individuals but the outcome of an appeal to the modern court is
unpredictable. A third party is available to enforce the statutory law but the court can act only if a plaintiﬀ
has brought a violation of the law to its attention through a due appeal procedure. Yet a plaintiﬀ may
hesitate to do that for fear of losing advantages associated with life in the community.
A major implication of the above is that from the observation that a state legislation is rarely applied,
one may not infer that it has little or no impact on people’s behavior and welfare. Legal pluralism may then
persist for a long time despite the legislator’s intention of displacing informal rules and customs. Because
2Examples can be extended to non-state agencies as well. When non-government organisatins (NGOs) prescribe rules
according to which land plots which they have improved for irrigation should be earmarked for women, invariably a signiﬁcant
portion of this land ends up being used by men.
3the latter rules adapt under the constraint of a new legal framework -the modern law acts as an "outside
anchor" that exerts a "magnet eﬀect" on the custom- such legal pluralism plays a progressive role. The
domain of applicability of our setting includes all matters related to land allocation decisions, marriage,
divorce, inheritance, etc.
This analytical perspective enables us to account for an observation frequently made by social scientists
outside economics: customary rules, far from being the static and rigid outcomes that economists tend
to depict as stable (Nash) equilibria, in reality are continuously evolving. Moreover, several scholars have
stressed that the transformation of customs may partly occur as a result of the existence of statutory laws
which have the eﬀect of conferring a stronger bargaining position on particular section(s) of the population.
For instance, the anthropologist Lavigne Delville says that “local landholding systems are not the expression
of an unchanging ‘traditional law’, but the fruit of a process of social change, which incorporates the eﬀects
of national legislation” (Lavigne Delville 2000: 114). Rao (2007) states that legal support eﬀectively adds
authority to women’s voice since their land claims are thereby strengthened even though they do not neces-
sarily resort to the formal court (Rao 2007: 312; see also Quisumbing et al., 2001; Davis, 2009). Studying
the eﬀects of Operation Barga, a program designed to implement and enforce the long-dormant agricultural
tenancy laws that regulated the rights of sharecroppers in India, Banerjee et al. (2002) have found that a
moderate reform of the legal contract succeeded in improving the situation of the tenants. By empowering
tenants without giving them full ownership of the land, Operation Barga has opened a real way out of the
status quo and enabled them to get a higher share of the additionnal output resulting from investment. The
enhanced bargaining power of the tenants has come with the new ’outside option’ provided as a result of the
reform of the legal contract.
Scholars concerned with micro-institutional problems in poor countries in which the custom is strong often
point out that solutions imposed by legislative ﬁat tend to have dismal results because they inevitably create
misunderstandings, uncertainty and disputes. Reforming customary rules by allowing them to evolve and
modernize themselves through the common law process — so that the law assimilates custom through court
decisions rather than through acts of the Parliament — appears as a much more eﬀective path of institutional
change (Cooter 1991).3 The central argument underlying our analysis implies an agreement with the idea
that imposing rules by ﬁat in societies traditionally ruled by the custom is often counter-productive. Yet, at
the same time, it suggests that enactment of new statutory laws that remain optional when they compete
3Thus, in the case of Papua New Guinea, Robert Cooter explains, the Land Disputes Settlement Act has provided a legal
ground and a system of mediators and courts to resolve disputes involving land under customary ownership. The crucial point
is that the land courts are bound only by the above act and custom. What Cooter argues is that the evolution of court-made
property law is driven by this system because "land disputes requiring the reﬁnement of property rights reach the courts with
suﬃcient frequency to support the common law process". One of the most challenging tasks facing the land courts is to ﬁnd
general principles behind the diversity of local customary practice and usage, and to make explicit authoriative statements on
that basis (Cooter 1991: 781-799). In other words, a key problem is not only that the common law process may be quite slow,
but also that there is no garantee that it will converge toward these general principles.
4with the custom may, under some conditions, that are not trivial, prompt desirable changes. This line of
inquiry raises the interesting question as to how radical the modern law should be to best promote the
interests of marginal groups. We show that a moderate law may be the optimal solution.
1.2 Review of the Literature
Apart from the social science sources cited above, some related questions have been studied in the law and
economics literature. However, the existing literature of the economic analysis of law (see Posner 1998 and
Cooter and Ulen 2004 for reviews) so far has not devoted much attention to the evolution of customary law
induced by the introduction or changes in formal law.4 This gap exists for two reasons. On one hand, the
current economic analysis of customary law (see Parisi 1998 for an excellent brief survey) has not studied
the behavior of customary judges, concentrating more on the question of the emergence of customary norms
and of the adherence of economic agents to these norms (opinio iuris). On the other hand, the study of
custom in the shadow of existing formal law (Epstein 1998) has been conducted mainly from the normative
perspective, addressing the social desirability of preserving the customary practices. In contrast, this paper
studies - from a positive perspective - the mechanics of evolution of customary law by explicitly modelling
the behavior of customary judges and the evolution of their incentives as the formal law gets introduced or
changed.
Nevertheless, we remain in the tradition of the economic analysis of law, by modelling the customary
judge as a rational agent who maximizes his utility. We also assume that this utility arises from prestige
motives (Posner 1998: 582), and from the desire to write a decision that is close to his preferences (Miceli
and Cosgel 1994, Rasmusen 1994). Furthermore, as in these latter two papers, the judge faces the trade-oﬀ
between writing his preferred decision and its potential reversal if one of the parties makes recourse to the
formal law.
A strand of the law and economics literature that addresses a related question is the analysis of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR), such as arbitration or mediation (see Mnookin 1998 for a brief survey). In this
literature, the contending parties can (or sometimes must) use arbitration before appealing to a court.
A key assumption is that the parties can choose among several potential arbitrators (which are typically
experts closely familiar with the issues involved in the dispute). One fundamental result is the arbitrator
exchangeability (Ashenfelter 1987), meaning that the arbitrators’ equilibrium decisions tend to vary in an
unpredictable way (i.e., such decisions are statistically exchangeable). This is because of the competitive
pressure caused by the fact that both contending parties can rule out an arbitrator whose decision they
expect to be unfavorable for their interests. Shavell (1995) studies the incentive eﬀects arising when ADR
4There are analyses of the evolution of the formal common law. Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007) study how the evolution of
the lawmaking by policy-motivated judges leads, because of the "washing away" of their biases, to the eﬃcient outcome. There
are no similar studies, to our best knowledge, concerning the informal rules.
5is added to the formal litigation process. He shows that pre-dispute agreements to resort to ADR increases
the expected utility of the parties and increases social welfare. Our analysis diﬀers in the direction of study:
we consider the eﬀect of the introduction of formal law in the setting where informal law already exists.
Another related question addressed in the ADR literature is the enforcement of arbitration decisions
(Posner 1998: 280). Based on his analysis of American legislation concerning arbitration statutes, Benson
(1995) makes an interesting claim that backing arbitration decisions by legal sanctions is not necessarily
welfare-increasing. Indeed, such sanctions can kill the incentive of using arbitration, since contending parties
usually prefer arbitration so as to avoid a lengthy legal process.
The reality of developing countries, however, severely limits the applicability of the existing analysis of
ADR. First, developed countries have achieved a high level of legal integration, and the usefulness of arbitra-
tion procedures arises from the need for less cumbersome and more private dispute settlement mechanisms.
In developing countries, genuine situations of legal pluralism exist owing to the relatively recent emergence
of statutory law. Second, contending parties cannot choose the customary judge among several alternatives.
In a small village setting, usually there is only one judge, and the only alternative to him is the formal court.
This implies that the competition mechanism studied by Ashenfelter (1987) cannot be easily translated into
the context of developing countries.
Finally, a key issue in the case of developing countries is the role of inequality in outside options. To
our knowledge, this question has not been addressed by the law and economics literature. This paper is the
ﬁrst attempt to ﬁll this gap. Nor has the other central issue as to what is the optimal statutory law in the
presence of an informal law been examined. More speciﬁcally, if the legislator wants to increase the welfare
of the poor, is it more eﬃcient to enact a radical or a moderate pro-poor law? This question which is at
the heart of the debate opposing reformists to revolutionaries in situations calling for social change will be
placed at the centre of the analysis oﬀered in this paper. We characterize the conditions under which a
moderate law better promotes the interests of the poor than a radical law.
1.3 Structure of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple model of legal dualism
with two legal systems: the statutory law and the custom. We distinguish between two types of possible
claimants, the rich people whose interests tend to be well protected by the custom, and the poor whose
interests tend to be neglected. People dissatisﬁed with the custom can appeal to the formal judge, yet the
informal arbiter acts strategically, and may move some distance away from his preferred outcome in order to
retain cases in the informal court. Poor individuals are assumed to be heterogeneous. After characterizing the
steady-state equilibria, and deriving the comparative statics results (subsection 2.4), we study the welfare
implications for the poor of a more or less radical pro-poor formal law (subsection 2.5) and the eﬀect of
6inequality (among the poor) on the informal law (subsection 2.6). We establish under which conditions too
radical a pro-poor legislation may be less favorable to the poor than a more moderate one.
Section 3 presents a number of examples illustrating how changes in various key parameters of the model
aﬀect the manner in which conﬂicts are resolved in several traditional societies. These examples are drawn
from the literature on women’s rights and land tenure, particularly in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa and
India. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Model of Legal Dualism
2.1 Outline of the model
We consider a community in which conﬂicts can be arbitrated either by a formal judge or by a customary
authority. The latter lives in the community and has, in each case, a preferred judgement which represents
the community’s dominant custom at the present time. In other words, the custom is modeled as a fairness
standard that has come to prevail following a long term evolution that we do not try to explain. It typically
aims at maintaining peace and social cohesion while upholding patriarchal norms of respectability, which
explains why it is often bent towards the interests of the old elite (see, e.g., Davis, 2009). Note that the
informal judge is not necessarily a single individual but may be a council composed of inﬂuential members
of the community (e.g., elders, lineage heads) such as the so-called shalish in Bangladesh (see Davis, 2009).
The formal judge operates in the framework of a court and bases his judgement on the written law. However,
even assuming, as we do in the following exercise, that people have perfect information about this law (and
suﬃcient trust in its enforceability), the modern judge’s verdict is not completely predictable for reasons
explained in the next subsection.
The community comprises of two groups of people distinguished according to whether their interests are
protected or not by customary rules. In case of conﬂict between them, the resolution is either informal - it
then takes place in the community - or formal - it takes place in a court. If the custom prevails, the players
participate in the production of a community-level public good, while, if one of them appeals to the formal
court, (s)he is excluded from the beneﬁts of this good. Thus, each non-excluded player contributes to the
production of the community-level public good and beneﬁts from it. By expulsion from the community, we do
not necessarily mean that the ’renegade’ is denied the rights to stay physically in the native village, but only
that he (she) is ostracised in the sense of being deprived of the right to participate in the local social game.
The outside option can be thought of as any alternative mechanism (e.g., a social protection mechanism)
providing services of the sort aﬀorded by participation in the village community. Physical expulsion from
the community would imply, for example, that land granted by a formal judge will not be appropriable by
the plaintiﬀ.
7Given that social exclusion involves a cost for the community, the assumption that such exclusion always
takes place when a member appeals to the formal court needs to be justiﬁed. Villagers depend on the
local authority not only for the resolution of conﬂicts but also for a variety of other functions, such as
representation of the community in negotiations with outside agents. Therefore, it is in their interest that
his prestige is preserved and this is why they would be willing to punish those who challenge his authority,
and contravene "norms of respectable behaviour" (Davis, 2009: 6), by appealing to a formal court of law.
As long as the loss to the community from a weakening of the authority of the informal judge exceeds
that of excluding a member from the social exchange game, the threat of ostracisation will be credible and
implemented following any appeal to the formal law.
Another (and perhaps more compelling) reason is suggested by a growing literature coming from the
experimental psychology. Following this line, community members would accept to incur a cost by punishing
a fellow member who appeals to the formal court because of a feeling of anger that such a deviant act arouses
in them. They react unkindly to unkind behaviors (Fehr and Falk, 2002; Fehr, Fischbacher and Gachter,
2002; Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). In their view, appealing to a stranger judge is
tantamount to betraying one’s community and may thus give rise to what Axelrod has called an emotive
reaction of ‘vengefulness’ (Axelrod 1997, Chap. 3, Frank 1988, Rabin 1993). Field interviews conducted in
Mali attest to the pertinence of this second source of credibility of ostracisation threats.5
2.2 Uncertainty in the formal legal system
As pointed out earlier, the formal judge’s verdict is assumed to be not completely predictable. Below, we
discuss three important sources of uncertainty: the former two have to do with veriﬁability problems while
the third one arises from imperfect knowledge about the type of the judge.
First, there is an information problem. Quoting Robert Bates, one can state this problem as follows:
"although those who impose the statutory law make eﬀorts to inform themselves (about the case), they
remain outsiders and are therefore less likely to possess detailed information than would neighbors and kin"
(Bates 2001: 64; see also Davis, 2009). Since witnesses are expected to present conﬂicting evidence before the
judge, the verdict eventually pronounced by him may well deviate from the ruling expected by the claimant
on the basis of his reading of the statutory law. For example, unlike the custom that prevailed until recently
in Sub-Saharan Africa, the statutory land law recognizes the right of an owner to alienate his land. Yet, local
witnesses or customary authorities can render the law void by arguing that the claimant is not the genuine
owner of the land that he has sold or wishes to sell. In an extreme situation, the evidence is so contradictory
that the judge may decide to abdicate and refer the case back to the informal settlement procedure.
Second, the judge may have not one but several bodies of law available to him to support his decision. In
5"We know how to bring back to their minds people who dare overstep the village authorities", said one village elder in the
Koutiala district (interview made by Jean-Philippe Platteau).
8other words, the situation may be more complex than the state of legal dualism depicted above. Note that
legal pluralism in this sense is more frequently observed in countries with important Muslim populations. In
Tanzania, for example, up until recently, inheritance was governed by diﬀerent laws of succession, including
customary, Islamic and statutory laws. The customary law is the most unfavorable to women and the
statutory law, which tends towards giving equal recognition to women’s rights, is the most favorable (the
Islamic law is somewhere in between). In deciding which law should apply to a particular case, courts tend
to base their judgement on what is known as the “mode-of-life test” whereby the ethnicity and religious
aﬃliation of the heir, as well as the intent of the deceased are taken into account. As a matter of principle,
customary law is applied to African Christians unless they can prove that the family had abandoned the
African mode of life, in which case statutory law applies. For African Muslims, the Islamic law is applied,
unless it can be proven that the deceased had other intentions (Longway 1999, as cited by Hilhorst 2000:
187).6 Uncertainty clearly is present in such a situation since it is rather easy for claimants to distort
information regarding their “mode of life” or the intent of the deceased. Yet, disagreement about the latter
may also be genuine rather than opportunistic. In the court of Koutiala (Mali), for example, a judge
explained how he dealt with the case of a woman who claimed an equal inheritance share against the will of
her only brother, on the basis of the statutory law. Applying the "mode-of-life test", he asked the brother
whether he was a "good Muslim". Since the answer was positive, he applied the Islamic law granting the
plaintiﬀ half the share of her brother (based on Verse 12 of Sourate IV of the Quran). Clearly, the plaintiﬀ
could have hoped to get a full share while the defendant could have expected her to be rebuked in the name
of the custom. In Senegal, like in Mali, the lawmakers have explicitly allowed the Muslim law to be invoked
in matters of inheritance because they have realized that the French-inspired statutory law is too distant
from the customary law to oﬀer a realistic alternative to it (Ntampaka 2004: 153-67).
Third, even in cases where there is a unique body of statutory laws, interpretation problems may create
an uncertainty. This point is much emphasized in the literature and is known in the legal profession as the
problem of the subjectivity of the judge. The ﬂexibility of the formal law can thus be used by the judge to
gain privileges for himself or to make it more congruent with his own preferences and values. The former
possibility is illustrated by the case of the Forestry Law in Cameroon where the overriding consideration of
the bureaucrats in charge of the law is to interpret it in such a way as to vest themselves with power and
privilege (Egbe, forthcoming). An example of the latter possibility is provided by the new Family Code of
Morocco which contains provisions much more favorable to women than the old one based on a combination
of the Islamic and customary laws. Factual evidence nevertheless shows that the new law is less strictly
applied by judges with more conservative inclinations (personal ﬁeld observations of Imane Chaara).7
6In 2001, laws voted in 1999 (the Land Act No. 4 and the Village Land Act No. 5) and providing for the integration of
customary practices into the modern law were eventually put into operation (personal communication of Rasel Madaha).
7One could alternatively think of the modern judge’s behaviour as being not totally unpredictable, say, because as is observed
92.3 Setup of the model
Imagine a community composed of two groups of individuals labelled A (the rich) and B (the poor). The
two groups have opposing interests and are unequally represented by the custom. At each point in time, an
individual becomes involved in a dispute with a member of the other group with probability δ. For simplicity,
we assume that the probability of becoming embroiled in two disputes simultaneously is negligibly small.
Whenever a dispute occurs, it is ﬁrst taken for mediation to a local authority whom we refer to as the
‘informal judge’ or ‘mediator’. After the mediator has made his ruling, either party may appeal the verdict
in a formal court of law. If the dispute reaches the formal court, then its ruling overrides that of the local
authority. However, as attested by ﬁeld observations conducted by one of us (J. P. Platteau) in rural West
Africa (Senegal and Mali in particular), the individual who appealed to the formal court is excluded thereafter
from the life of the community. Consistent with this setting, we assume that the size of the community is
measured by the number of villagers participating in its social game.
Formally, we have an inﬁnite horizon game with the following timing of events within each period: (i)
ﬁrst, the informal judge declares a ‘custom’, vM; (ii) disputes emerge in the community, each involving one
individual from group A and another from group B; (iii) each dispute is ﬁrst addressed by the informal judge
who is constrained to give a verdict that corresponds to the ‘custom’ announced at the beginning of the
period; (iv) the disputants in a case decide simultaneously whether to appeal the initial verdict at the formal
court; (v) if a dispute reaches the formal court, then its ruling vF overrides that of the informal judge; (vi)
an individual who has appealed to the formal court is excluded from community life and receives a utility
corresponding to his outside option thereafter; the remaining members participate in the production of a
community-level public good.
The requirement that a ‘custom’ must be announced at the beginning of each period ensures that all cases
brought to the informal judge in a single period are dealt with in a consistent manner. This requirement
seems reasonable given that a mediator who gives a diﬀerent ruling to two cases, that are brought to him at
the same time and are exactly alike, is likely to lose credibility with both sections of the community, and may
well lose his position of authority in consequence. The mediator is actually responsible for the social cohesion
of the community, and this precludes him from making what would appear as arbitrary decisions. This rules
out the possibility that he issues type-dependent verdicts, using all the information at hand about the outside
options of individual community members (which should be done from a mechanism design perspective).
The assumption that the judgement pronounced by the informal mediator is certain runs counter to the
idea of a genuine adjudication of a conﬂict which by deﬁnition is uncertain. This assumption is made to
in some African contexts, he systematically consults with customary authorities or takes inspiration from customary practices
before making his decision. In these conditions, the formal judgement will obviously be less distant from the customary
judgement than would be the case if the former is totally unpredictable. Since we are not certain that this second scenario is
more prevalent than the ﬁrst - claimants often ignore the type of the formal judge, for example, they ignore whether he is more
or less sensitive to customary norms - we will make the most economical assumption that the formal judgement is unpredictable.
10keep our model as simple as possible, and it is innocuous since the decision to appeal to the modern court
system is taken after the customary judgement has been pronounced. For the sake of consistency, one may
wish to view step (iii) as a process of consultation (rather than adjudication) in the course of which a local
authority asserts the custom that applies to a given case.
Although we assume that the two disputants simultaneously choose whether or not to appeal a verdict of
the informal judge in the formal court (stage iv above), the game is essentially unchanged if they make their
respective decisions sequentially. This is because the interests of the two disputants are perfectly opposed,
so that only one of them may have an incentive to appeal to the formal court following any speciﬁc verdict
by the mediator.
We represent the range of possible outcomes of a case by the interval [0,1], where an outcome of 0 is most
favorable to A and 1 is most favorable to B. This interval is also the set of possible values for the custom
chosen by the informal judge at stage (i) and for the verdicts given at stage (iii) within each period.
The informal judge has a preferred custom, I ∈ [0,1]. In each period that he declares a custom vM




where g (0) = 0 and g(x) > 0 for x ≷ 0.
We assume that the cost function g is upward sloping and convex: g′ > 0,> g′′ > 0. On the other hand,
he receives ‘prestige-related’ utility X (n) that depends on the current size of the community. We assume
that X′ > 0, i.e. the utility that he derives from the prestige associated with his position is increasing in
the size of the community. For ease of exposition (and without substantial loss of generality), we assume
hereafter that the preferences of the informal judge are perfectly aligned with those of individuals in group
A; i.e. I = 0. This assumption implies that only individuals within group B, who belong to socially marginal
categories of the population, would have an incentive to contest the decision of the informal judge in the
formal court following any dispute.
The population is heterogenous in terms of their outside options. In particular, the distribution of outside
options within group B is described by a cumulative distribution function H (.) such that the fraction of
group-B individuals with per-period outside option below ω equals H (ω) (it is unnecessary to describe the
outside options of group A individuals as they never have an interest in exiting the community when I = 0).
In each period, participation in the social exchange game of the local community yields a utility of Y (n)
to each participant, where n is the current size of the community. We assume Y ′ > 0; i.e. the individual
beneﬁt derived from the community-level public good is increasing in the number of participants. Since in our
model only type-B individuals are susceptible of exiting the community, this assumption means that there
is a social loss suﬀered by (remaining) community members whenever an individual from the marginalized
group leaves the social game, thus modifying the composition of the community’s population.
Given the uncertainty in the formal legal system, the ruling in the formal court is described by a stochastic






8. Thus, a higher value of φ indicates a
lower variance of the verdict.
The preferences over possible verdicts are given by uA (1 − v) for a type-A individual and by uB (v) for
a type-B individual and uA (.) and uB (.) are increasing and concave. The concavity of the function ensures
that the individuals are averse to the uncertainty of the verdict in the formal court. In addition, there
is a (transaction) cost, represented by c if the plaintiﬀ opts for the formal court. This cost captures the
administrative expenses involved in going to a formal court which includes the fees at the court but also,
if a wider interpretation is adopted, the cost of access to information, transportation costs, the presence or
absence of organizational support, etc. It may also include the psychological cost of bringing a local dispute
into the open by taking it to an external agency, and the intimidation suﬀered at the hands of community
representatives.
In summary, we can represent the per-period utility level of each agent as follows. If the declared custom
is vM and the current size of the community is n, then
— the informal judge receives utility equal to









— a type-B individual with outside option ω who appeals the decision of the informal judge at the formal
court and is expelled from the community in consequence receives
EuB ￿
vF￿
+ ω − c.
We shall assume for the main analysis that the disputants make the decision whether or not to appeal a
verdict of the informal judge myopically; that is, they take into consideration the beneﬁts and costs of their
choice in the current period only (we show in Appendix B that the outcome is not qualitatively diﬀerent
when they also take into account the loss of future beneﬁts from leaving the community). Assuming that
people do not coordinate their decision to exit the community, given a custom vM, a type-B myopic agent
with outside option ω would choose to have the case settled in the informal court if and only if
Y (n) + u
￿
vM￿




8We assume that the constant f and the random variable ￿ θ are such that the support of vF falls within the interval [0,1].
12Given n and vM, we obtain a threshold value ω
￿
n,vM￿
at which the condition in (1) is satisﬁed with




is indiﬀerent between choosing the infor-
mal and the formal court to resolve a dispute, where Λ = (c,f,φ) is the 3-tuple of parameters that describe






is the fraction of individuals of
type B who are willing to have a dispute resolved within the customary system when the community size is
n and the declared custom is vM.

























In other words, nss ￿
vM,Λ
￿
is the largest community size for which, given custom vM, the number of people




those with the highest outside options will opt to resolve their disputes in the formal court and therefore be
excluded from the community. Since the size of the community aﬀects both the utility of the informal judge
and that of type-B individuals who have not (yet) appealed, a decrease in this size will cause the process of
social exclusion to continue till the population shrinks to size nss ￿
vM,Λ
￿
. At this stage, the community will






who, by deﬁnition, will choose
to resolve their disputes in the informal court. On the other hand, if nss ￿
vM,Λ
￿
= 1, then the exclusion
process will never begin, because no individual in the community sees any advantage in taking a dispute to
the formal court. Whenever the community is such that all those who remain within it seek to have their
disputes resolved by means of the informal court, we shall say that the community is in the steady-state.
It is useful to represent the steady-state graphically (we suppress some of the notation for legibility).
Figure 1 plots the function H (ω(n,v)) against n for some given distribution H (.), and custom v. For
this example, we have assumed that H (ω (1,v)) < 1, such that individuals within the community with the
highest outside options would have an incentive to leave when the community is of size 1. The community
will attain its steady-state at nss (v) which in the ﬁgure is given by the intersection of the curve and the
45-degree dotted line.
The ﬁgure also makes clear why we are interested in nss (v), the highest value of n (smaller than the
initial size of 1) at which the curve and the 45-degree line intersect. Starting from an initial size of 1, the
community will ﬁnd its steady state at the point of intersection furthest to the right. While the curve and
the line may also intersect for smaller values of n, these cannot be attained (for a given set of parameters)
because there is no further exit once the steady-state at nss (v) has been reached. Multiple equilibria are
therefore precluded.
13Figure 1: Steady-state equilibrium
2.4 Comparative Statics
A change in any of the parameters c,f, and φ would aﬀect the threshold outside option for each n and vM,
therefore shifting the curve in Figure 1 and giving rise to a new steady-state. In particular, for a given v, an
increase in c raises the curve and thus leads to a higher steady-state, while an increase in f or φ lowers the
curve and leads to a lower steady-state. A higher vM shifts the curve upwards leading to a larger nss. Yet,
note that v = vM is endogenous to the strategy of the informal judge. Because the prestige of the informal
judge is increasing in the size of the community, he has an incentive to deviate from the traditional custom
if he is thereby able to retain people within the community.
Let us now consider the custom that maximizes steady-state level of utility of the informal judge. This
will not necessarily correspond to the optimal strategy, especially if disputes within the community are
infrequent. However, if the steady-state is attained quickly because of frequent disputes and exits from
the community (or if the judge is suﬃciently patient), then the optimal steady-state choice should closely
approximate the overall optimal choice.
The custom that maximizes the steady-state level of utility for the informal judge is given by
ˆ vM = argmax
v X (nss (v)) − g (v). (3)




− g′ (v) = X′ (nss (v))
h(ω)u′ (v)
1 − h(ω)Y ′ (nss (v))
− g′ (v) = 0 (4)
where we have substituted for ∂nss




The economic intuition behind this expression is as follows. The ﬁrst term, X′ (nss (v)) ∂nss
∂v , represents
the marginal beneﬁt of opting for a custom that is more favorable to type-B individuals. A custom that
is marginally more favorable to B would increase the steady-state size of the community by ∂nss
∂v and each
unit of this increase is multiplied by the per-unit increase in the prestige of the mediator, X′ (nss (v)). The
second term is simply the marginal cost of this action, coming from the incremental disutility of moving the
custom away from the mediator’s preferred point. The payoﬀ-maximizing custom thus equates the marginal
beneﬁt to the marginal cost. Note that the changes in ∂nss
∂v , i.e. how eﬀective is the change in custom in
increasing the size of the community, would crucially aﬀect the equilibrium custom, ￿ vM.
We can now consider how the optimal choice of the informal judge changes with parameters c, f, and φ.
The comparative statics results are described in the following proposition (see Appendix A for the complete
proof).
Proposition 1 : (i) If h′ (ω) ≤ 0, then ˆ vM is decreasing in c, the cost of accessing the formal court for the
poor; increasing in f, the mean of the verdict of the formal judge; and in φ, the inverse of the variance of
the formal verdict.
(ii) If h′ (ω) > 0 and X′′ (.),Y ′′ (.) ≈ 0, then ˆ vM is increasing in c, and decreasing in f and φ.
(iii) The steady-state size of the community is increasing in c and decreasing in f and φ for all distribu-
tions H (.).
The proposition states that, if h′ (ω) < 0, any change in the formal legal system (as described by the
parameters c,f, and φ) that makes it more attractive for a type-B individual to exit the community would
also induce the informal judge to opt for a law or custom that is correspondingly more favorable to B. In
other words, the "magnet eﬀect" operates. However, paradoxically, if h′ (ω) > 0, and the functions X (.)
and Y (.) are linear, then the informal judge opts for a custom that is more favorable to A when type-B
individuals ﬁnd their interests better served by the formal system. There is then a repulsive eﬀect of the
modern law.
The simple insight behind these results is that the strength of the incentive of the informal judge to
provide a ruling that deviates from his preferred verdict is determined by the mass of type-B individuals
he would persuade to remain within the informal system by doing so. If h′ (ω) < 0, then any exogenous
change which renders the formal legal system more attractive to B (or, equivalently, lowers the threshold
value of the exit option) raises the mass of type-B individuals who are just indiﬀerent between the formal
15and informal court. As a result, there is also an increase in the additional number of cases that the informal
judge can keep under his jurisdiction by making the custom marginally more favorable to B. Therefore, he
would opt for a custom that is more supportive of B. In other words, the "magnet eﬀect" operates. The
opposite is true if h′ (ω) > 0: in this case, making the formal system more favorable to B (say, by increasing
f) decreases the mass of type-B individuals who are just indiﬀerent between the formal and informal court,
and thus the mediator’s net marginal beneﬁt of raising v declines. He thus opts for a more conservative
custom (i.e. one that is more favorable to A). There is then a repulsive eﬀect of the modern law.
In either case, as the formal court becomes more favorable to type-B individuals, they will opt for the
formal system in greater numbers and the community will reach its steady-state at a smaller value of n. In
particular, even when the mediator responds to a change in the formal law by moving the custom in the
same direction, his reaction is never strong enough to fully outweigh the change in the formal law.
Note that in the special case where the distribution of outside options is uniform (h′(ω) = 0), the "magnet
eﬀect" of the statutory law on the custom still operates.
The above analysis is restricted to situations where the customary law is preserved and coexists with the
modern statutory law. Within the same framework, an alternative situation may arise where the former is
superseded by the latter. Such a situation is depicted in Figure 2 (see curve I). Here, the curve H (ω(n))
lies entirely below the 45-degree line. It may be too costly for the informal judge to adopt a customary law





intersects with the dotted line. Then he would choose vM = I = 0,
which would lead to exit by the individuals with the highest outside options, followed by an exodus by the
remainder of the poor in the community. Such a situation is likely to occur when the value of participating
in the social exchange game of the community declines steeply when individuals initially begin to leave
the community, and/or a large fraction of the poor in the community have very attractive outside options.
Since these conditions are unlikely to be observed in reality, the scenario in which only rich members of the
community remain within the ambit of the custom is implausible. At the other extreme, we ﬁnd a situation
in which the highest intersection point of the curve H(ω
￿
n,vM￿
) whith the 45◦ line occurs precisely at n =
1 (see curve II in ﬁgure 2): attractiveness of the modern court system is low enough to induce the informal
judge to set the custom in such a way that no type-B individual is tempted to leave the community.
16Figure 2: All the poor leave the community (I) or nobody leaves it (II)
2.5 Welfare Analysis and Public Intervention
A legal reform that makes the formal law more favorable to the poor has three distinct eﬀects on the welfare
of the poor. First, those who had previously opted out of the custom and currently use the formal system
to settle their disputes receive a direct beneﬁt from the reform. Second, those who remain within the ambit
of the custom are aﬀected indirectly since the mediator changes the custom as a reaction to the change in
the formal law. Following Proposition 1, this eﬀect can be either positive or negative. In addition, we know
from Proposition 1 that some additional members will leave the informal system following any pro-poor legal
reform. This leads to the third eﬀect: a loss in the value of being part of the community for those who have
remained in the now smaller community.
To represent the aggregate welfare of the poor individuals in the population mathematically, remember
that Λ = (c,f,φ) denotes the 3-tuple of parameters that describe the formal legal system. For clarity of
exposition, we write as ω(n,v,Λ), nss (v,Λ) and ˆ vM (Λ), the corresponding functions deﬁned in section 2.3,
to express clearly the dependence of the steady-state equilibrium on the characteristics of the formal legal
system. Let ˆ nss (Λ) = nss ￿
ˆ vM (Λ),Λ
￿
, ˆ ω(Λ) = ω
￿
ˆ nss (Λ), ˆ vM (Λ),Λ
￿
. Then the aggregate welfare of the
17poor can be expressed as follows:
W = H (ˆ ω(Λ))
￿














The ﬁrst term has two multiplicative components: H (ˆ ω(Λ)) is the fraction of the population which remains
within the community when ˆ ω (Λ) is the threshold outside option, while the expression within the curved
brackets is the expected per-period utility for each community member. The second term contains the
expression in the square brackets, which is the expected per-period utility of an individual with outside
option ω who has left the community and the integral represents the average utility of these individuals.
Then we can obtain the marginal eﬀect on the welfare of a pro-poor legal reform by diﬀerentiating this









ˆ vM￿ dˆ vM
df
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Here, the three eﬀects outlined above can be seen clearly. The term Y ′ (ˆ nss) dˆ nss
df represents the loss
in welfare for each community member when someone is excluded from the social life of the community;
δu′ ￿
ˆ vM￿ dˆ vM
df is the eﬀect on these same members of the reaction of the customary authority to the change
in the formal law; and, ﬁnally, the term δ
dEu(vF)
df is the gain for a poor individual who has already left the
community. Thus, we have the following result.
Corollary 1 An increase in f has three distinct eﬀects on the welfare of the poor within the community: (i)
a loss in utility for each community member equal to Y ′ (ˆ nss) dˆ n
ss
df , (ii) an additional change in utility for
each community member equal to δu′ ￿
ˆ vM￿ dˆ vM
df which may be positive or negative, and (iii) a gain in utility
for each poor individual who has already left the community equal to δ
dEu(vF)
df .
The interesting question to ask is whether and under what conditions a moderate pro-poor reform can be
superior to a radical reform from the viewpoint of the poor themselves. To determine these conditions, we
consider the second derivative of the welfare function with respect to f. Deriving throughout the expression
in (5) with respect to f, we obtain
∂2W







































The second derivatives of ˆ nss and ˆ vM with respect to f depend on the third derivative of the functions
X (.),Y (.),g (.). Therefore, they can be ignored if we assume that these third derivatives are close to zero.
18We thus get the following expression for the second derivative of the objective function:
























where we have used the fact that dvF
df = 1. If this expression is negative for all values of f, the welfare function
is globally concave, and therefore we obtain an interior solution. This would imply that a moderate legal
reform leads to higher welfare for the marginalized section of the community than either a radical reform or
abiding by the custom (i.e. providing the community no alternative to the custom to resolve disputes). On
the other hand, if the expression is positive for all values of f, the welfare function is globally convex, and we
obtain a corner solution. In this case, either a radical reform or abiding by the custom dominates a moderate
reform. The exact shape of the welfare function depends on the curvature of the functions Y (.) and u(.).
Here, we state a proposition highlighting two cases in which we can unambiguously rank a moderate reform
and its radical alternatives in terms of the welfare of the marginalized section of the community. These
cases provide an intuition for the conditions under which a moderate reform is desirable (For the proof, see
Appendix A).
Proposition 2 (i) If the elasticity of the marginal beneﬁt of being part of the community with respect to its
size is below 1, and utility is linear in the outcome of a dispute, then either abiding by the custom or carrying
out a radical reform dominates a moderate reform in the formal law.
(ii) If the utility function u(.) is concave and if the above elasticity exceeds 1+δ
￿
1
h(ˆ ω(Λ))Y ′(ˆ nss(Λ)) − 1
￿
for
each value of f, then the welfare function is globally concave for some c,φ. Then, if the welfare maximization
problem has an interior solution, a moderate reform dominates both a radical reform and abiding by the
custom in terms of the welfare of the poor.
The intuition behind the proposition is as follows. Exclusion of individuals diminishes the value of
participating in the social life of the community and, therefore, entails a loss for those remaining within the
ambit of the custom. On the other hand, as the formal law becomes more radical, and more of the poor
leave the community, this loss is suﬀered by a diminishing number of people. If the elasticity of the marginal
beneﬁt of being part of the community with respect to its size is below 1, then the ﬁrst (infra-marginal)
eﬀect is oﬀset by the second (marginal) eﬀect. Under these circumstances, a radical reform would dominate
a moderate reform. At the same time, abiding by the custom may dominate a radical reform if exit by any
individual from the community entails a signiﬁcant cost for those who remain behind.
Under the assumptions that (i) the net beneﬁt of participating in the social life of the community is
suﬃciently sensitive to its size, and (ii) the utility function is concave, the welfare function is concave. Then,
19the implementation of a moderate law is preferred to a radical reform.9 Concavity of the utility function
means that the poor are averse to unpredictable outcomes, or that they attach little additional value to
a verdict that favours them more than a moderate outcome. The latter feature is likely to be observed
whenever the poor do not value strong departures from custom-based outcomes because they have somehow
internalized the social norms embedded in the tradition. If this internalization process is driven by the rich
who beneﬁt more from the custom, the existence of an interior solution follows, in part, from the fact that
the interests of the rich are implicitly taken into account by the poor. In these circumstances, as noted
by Chirayath, Sage, and Woolcock (2005), "Imposing formal mechanisms on communities without regard
for the local level processes and informal legal systems may not only be ineﬀectual, but can actually create
major problems" (Chirayath et al. 2005: 5). As has been suggested earlier (subsection 2.2), in West Africa,
the legislators have realized that the statutory law inherited from the French colonial period was too distant
from the prevailing custom in at least some matters (e.g., inheritance). They therefore allowed another
law system closer to the custom (the Islamic law) to be optionally applied in the modern court. In the
study about the impact of Operation Barga in India, Banerjee et al. (2002) have shown that a moderate
legal reform empowering tenants without giving them full landownership can have a positive eﬀect on their
incomes (see supra). In this way, the authors argue, the delicate trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and equity has
been avoided.
2.6 Eﬀect of the Distribution of Outside Options on the Custom
In sections (2.4) and (2.5), we discussed how the informal law is inﬂuenced by changes in the formal legal
system, and the socially optimal legal reform within the formal system when the informal judge behaves
strategically. Next, we discuss how the distribution of outside options in the community inﬂuences the
behavior of the informal judge for a given formal legal system.
Intuitively, the greater the number of individuals susceptible of leaving the community because of an
unfavourable custom, the more inclined will be the informal judge to choose a custom that is pro-poor. On
the other hand, those who have very good outside options and would exit the community in any case, and
those who would choose to remain in the community even if the custom is unfavorable owing to poor outside
options, will not inﬂuence the decision of the informal judge. The following proposition provides conditions
for the distribution of outside options that will make the custom chosen in one community more conservative
than in another.
9If being part of the community is suﬃciently valuable (or, contrarily, has suﬃciently low value), we may still obtain the
result that abiding by the custom or a radical reform dominates a moderate reform.
20Proposition 3 Assume that X′′,Y ′′ ≈ 0. Denote by v1 and v2 the respective customs that maximize the
utility of the informal judge for distributions H1 (.) and H2 (.). Denote by n1 (v) and n2 (v) the corresponding
sizes of the community in steady-state when the custom is described by v. If H′
2 (ω) ≶ H′
1 (ω) for each ω =
ω(ni (v),v),v ∈ [0,1],i = 1,2, then v2 ≶ v1.
Proposition 3 says that, comparing two distributions of outside options, if the population density for one
of them is lower over some interval consisting of the range of all possible values of ω (i.e. the outside option
at which an individual is indiﬀerent between the two legal systems), then the informal judge will choose a
more conservative custom. If the opposite is true, he will choose a more progressive (pro-poor) custom. The
idea is that a more unequal distribution of outside options is likely to be reﬂected in a lower density of (poor)
individuals in the critical range where they can be possibly prompted to opt out of the community, that is,
in the range that really matters for the informal judge.
 




H’2(ω) < H’1(ω) for 
a < ω < b 
 
Figure 3: Distribition of outside options
We can use this proposition to argue that increased market opportunities (e.g. access to trading oppor-
tunities) that can be exploited in the absence of community ties may well cause the custom to become more
conservative if they bypass the relatively poor. To see this, note that as market opportunities increase, the
distribution of outside options should shift to the right, causing the steady-state size of the community to
decrease. If those who initially had poor outside options are left out of this process, then over time the
21population density with outside options in the middle of the range should decline. Then the distribution of
outside options obtaining as a result of the enlarged market opportunities may be represented by H2 (.) with
H′
2 (ω) < H′
1 (ω) over some interval, where H1 (.) represents the original distribution (see Figure 3). If the
outside option at which an individual is indiﬀerent between the two legal systems falls within this interval
for all possible values of the custom, then, applying Proposition 3, the informal judge opts for a custom that
is closer to his ideal point when the distribution of outside options is described by H2 (.). In other words,
increased market opportunities drive the custom in a direction that is detrimental to the interests of the
poor.
3 Application: Formal laws and informal rules in the case of
women’s and immigrants’ rights
This section illustrates, on the basis of several examples, how formal law can have an inﬂuence on the welfare
of the disadvantaged through its eﬀect on the behavior of the informal judges.
Inheritance. In the Senegal river valley, all populations are Muslim and they have been so for several
centuries. Indeed, Islamization of these societies resulted from the colonization of the (Middle) valley by
successive waves of foreign conquerors since the 10th century, and Maraboutic power used the 1776 revolution
in Senegal to assert itself and establish the Almaami regime based on the Islamic law (Minvielle 1977). It is,
therefore, not surprising that local inhabitants are quite aware that the Qur’an contains provisions that deal
explicitly with inheritance. In particular, there is a Qur’anic prescription to the eﬀect that women should
inherit half of the share of their brothers. Despite the existence of this religious prescription, and perfect
information about its content, the customary principle according to which women do not inherit at all has
been generally followed until recently. The idea that daughters are entitled to inherit a share of the family
land is deemed unacceptable in patriarchal societies because of the fear that ancestral lands may fall into
stranger hands or be excessively split, especially when marriage practices follow the rule of virilocal exogamy
(Goody 1976). Yet, this observation qualiﬁes Timur Kuran’s statement that in a matter such as inheritance
that it addresses explicitly, the Qur’an carries an explicitly strong authority (Kuran 2003, 2004).
In the above situation, as a ﬁeld survey revealed (Platteau et al., 1999), women never thought of invoking
the Islamic law to advance their interests lest they should antagonize their male relatives and be compelled to
forsake key social protections that they have traditionally enjoyed. Under the customary land tenure system,
indeed, women are insured against various contingencies, in particular the prospects of separation/divorce,
widowhood, and unwed motherhood. In such circumstances, they typically enjoy the right to return to their
father’s land where they are allowed to work and subsist till they ﬁnd a new husband (see also Cooper 1997:
62-63, for similar observations in the case of Niger). This means that the cost of appealing to the Islamic law
(considered here as the formal law) and of resorting to the local marabout (considered here as the formal
22judge) was too high in terms of (insurance) beneﬁts foregone for the formal law to confer bargaining power
upon rural women. Moreover, the psychological cost of taking a land dispute to the formal judge was also
perceived to be large insofar as, in the women’s view, open disputes between close kin "are to be avoided
at all cost" (Cooper 1997: 79). In terms of our model, we are in the case where the steady-state size of the
community equals its initial size.
Over the last decades, however, as shown by a study of sixteen villages located in the delta area (de-
partment of Dagana) and the Middle valley (departments of Podor and Matam), the cost of being excluded
from the community has fallen as a result of an increase in women’s education and an expansion of their
non-agricultural employment opportunities (Platteau et al., 1999). Moreover, women that have completed
their primary schooling and those who have a non-agricultural occupation (even after excluding marketing of
agricultural products) have a tendency to manifest their opposition against customary practices such as the
levirate system (whereby a widow is remarried to a brother of her deceased husband)10. Although the study
did not measure the proclivity of (progressive) women to call customary inheritance practices openly into
question or to invoke the Islamic law, it is interesting to note that the custom has recently evolved toward
enhancing women’s rights.
There is no evidence, though, that the custom has adopted the Islamic prescription according to which
daughters should inherit half of their brothers’ share. Instead, what we ﬁnd is an evolving practice of
transfers aimed at compensating women for their de facto exclusion from inheritance of a portion of their
father’s land. The same phenomenon has been observed in Niger where Cooper (1997) describes cases where
women, in recognition of their ownership rights, receive part of the crop harvested on the family land by their
brothers under an arrangement known as aro (Cooper 1997: 78). This said, women’s access to land often
remains fragile and diﬃcult to secure: owing to their absence from the native village following marriage,
they typically ﬁnd it diﬃcult to exercise whichever rights over land might have been granted to them, all
the more so as their male relatives are ready to exploit the situation (Cooper 1997: 81).
This inability to secure their rights on land explains why, in ﬁeldwork, it is so diﬃcult to obtain precise
information about the extent of women’s rights as well as about the amount and regularity of unilateral
transfers received from their brothers. Another reason lies in the fact that male respondents are obviously
embarrassed when their un-Islamic behavior is pointed to them. This embarrassment reﬂects the potential
impact of the formal law even when it is not actually followed. As is evident from the above story, such
potential impact is manifested in the gradual transformation of the custom in a direction favorable to women.
The ultimate cause of this transformation, we argue, is the emergence of valuable exit opportunities that
have the eﬀect of decreasing the cost for women of being excluded from the community. To put it in another
way, the expansion of education and non-agricultural employment opportunities for women provides them
10There is plausibly a identiﬁcation problem here. Indeed, it could be argued that women with a more independent character
tend to better succeed at school and in obtaining employment outside the farm sector.
23with better outside options that diminish the importance of traditional social protection mechanisms in the
event that they fall under distress due to separation, widowhood, unwed motherhood, etc.
Divorce, marriage, and widowhood. In the Sahel, the gradual transformation of the custom re-
garding women’s rights to initiate a divorce can be analyzed in the light of the above discussion. In the
initial situation, divorce was not readily granted to a wife wishing to leave her husband except in the case
of proven mistreatment by the latter (Kevane 2004; Platteau et al., 1999). Over the recent years, however,
women have progressively acquired a de facto right to leave an unhappy union. The main reasons are two:
ﬁrst, the severity of social sanctions against leaving an arranged marriage has diminished, to a large extent
as a result of continued migration to neighboring countries such as the Ivory Coast. Second, there is the
eﬀect of administrative pressure “as successive regimes continue to push for explicit legal rules and rights for
women in marriage” (Kevane 2004: 75, Jewsiewicki 1993). As pointed out by Hillhorst (2000), “A stronger
legal status does not automatically aﬀord women more independence but it may provide a strong bargaining
position” (Hillhorst 2000: 195).
From a tribal area in India (Jharkhand) comes another story illustrating the capacity of the formal
law to promote women’s interests through evolution of the custom. There, a law known as the Santal
Pargana Tenancy Act (1949) recognizes women’s inheritance rights through marriage to a resident son-in-
law (gharjawae), but only in the absence of a male heir in the woman’s family (Rao 2007). This law was
intended to protect such women against harassment and acts of violence by male kin eager to appropriate
the land which has fallen into their hands. Registering a gharjawae marriage with the authorities aﬀords
a woman an eﬀective protection. Two lessons from this experience deserve special attention. First, as
a consequence of the law, customary authorities (village elders) have modiﬁed the custom in a direction
favorable to women. It is apparently because of prestige reasons - they want “to present themselves as fair
and just” - that they have adopted a more pro-women stance. Second, the new law does not represent a
radical departure from the existing practice, and this appears to be an important reason why it has had a
real impact. As a matter of fact, “The SPTA [Santal Pargana Tenancy Act] represented the gharjawae as an
adopted son-in-law who inherits the land, rather than the daughter”, and it is thus far away from the Hindu
Succession Act (1956) which provides equal inheritance rights to sons and daughters (Rao 2007: 310-311; in
the same vein, see Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2002, for Ethiopia). Interestingly, the SPTA was inspired by
a practice that evolved in the area itself. However, under conditions of growing scarcity of land, the practice
of the gharjawae marriage was increasingly contested by male kin who tended to bend decisions of village
elders in their favour. Thanks to the enactment of the Act and the registering procedure that it provides,
this evolution of the custom in favour of men’s interests has been counteracted.
In rural areas subject to acute land pressure, such as in areas with good access to water and high
population growth, the situation is often much less favorable to women than the one discussed above in the
24case of Sahelian countries. There, instead of improving exit opportunities for women, it is the scarcity-induced
evolution of the custom in a direction contrary to their interests which induces them to have recourse to the
formal law. Scarcity of land assets tends to undermine women’s customary rights of access, making them
more vulnerable, especially after the death of their husband. In Rwanda, the customary right of a daughter
to return to her father’s land in the event of separation, divorce or unwed motherhood became increasingly
threatened as land pressure grew, giving rise to severe intra-family conﬂicts (André and Platteau, 1998; for
Kenya, see Haugerud, 1993: 162-182; Verma, 2001, and Henrysson and Joireman, 2009). In Uganda, the
Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA), reported that 40% of the cases they handled were related to the
harassment of widows and property grabbing by their husbands’ relatives (Bikaako and Ssenkumba 2003:
250). In the Luwero and Torero areas, 29% out of a total of 204 widows indicated that property was taken
from them following the death of their husbands. In Zambia, 41% of female-headed households with orphans
indicated that they had lost all their cattle and 47% had lost all their pigs (Joireman 2008: 1240). In Niger,
half of the women living in the city of Maradi and who inherited land from their fathers lost that land as
a result of some action (sale or appropriation) by their brothers (Cooper 1997: 81- 82). As noted by S.F.
Joireman (2008: 1240), “if land is valuable, or a woman has property left by her husband that is viewed
as valuable, she may ﬁnd herself cast oﬀ with no land to farm and her household goods appropriated by
members of the lineage”.11
The above-described situation, born of growing land pressure, is bad for women on a double count. For
one thing, like in the above-told story about Jharkand, there has been a regressive shift of the custom
reﬂected in the erosion of women’s use rights, particularly in cases of widowhood. (In terms of our model, I
decreases and gets closer to zero assuming that I > 0 initially). For another thing, beneﬁts for women from
participating in the life of the community have decreased, as attested by the undermining of customary social
protection mechanisms. (In terms of our model, Y (n) decreases for all n). Following these two changes, which
have reduced the attractiveness of the customary law system, some women are prompted to confront the
new local practices by appealing to the modern court system implying that they exit the community. Such
trend is strengthened as a result of the work of city-based civil society organisations which advocate legal
reforms favourable to women, raise awarness among them, and support their eﬀorts to appeal to the formal
law (which, in terms of our model, has the eﬀect of lowering c). Over time, depending on the precise shape
of the distribution of outside options, the custom should evolve again, hopefully in a pro-women direction
(if h′(ω) ≤ 0).
Land rights. Women are not the only social group which can be considered as discriminated against
under the customary system of land tenure in lineage-based societies. Immigrants form another such group
11In such situations, women are left with no other option than migrating to cities where they may try to engage in some
(trade) business or prostitution and, if they are successful, they will end up purchasing a dwelling and perhaps some farmland
(Cooper 1997: 82-89).
25whose rights turn highly precarious when land pressure becomes acute (Platteau 2000, Chap. 4). In the
Ivory Coast where such circumstances have sparked extreme tensions which degenerated into wild expulsion
of foreign immigrants (mainly Burkinabé), the state eventually passed a law (Law N◦ 98-750, 23 December
1998) that declares lands cultivated by immigrants to be state land leased to them for a period of 99 years
(Aka 2007). This is a vivid illustration of how the formal law can force customary practices to evolve in
conditions where they are both ineﬃcient (since immigrants are dynamic farmers) and inequitable. The
Ivorian state was successful because it did not choose too radical a solution: stopping short of granting full
private property rights to immigrants, it conferred upon them an ownership status (long-term use rights)
that is more acceptable to village communities because it is part of a tradition inherited from colonial and
post-independence times (bare ownership of rural lands is vested in the state). As a result, the situation was
stabilized. A more radical pro-immigrant law provision would have been less favorable to this vulnerable
group as it would have stirred up huge resentful and antagonistic feelings within the host rural communities.
In terms of our model, the legislator appears to have avoided (continuing with) too radical a reform because
of the considerable loss of social beneﬁts from community life that its enactement would have entailed for
the (marginal) people remaining in the village.
Speed of reform. The question as to how radical a legislation ought to be to have signiﬁcant eﬀects
has always been the object of intense controversies between reformists and revolutionaries concerned with
improving the lot of the poor. For instance, toward the beginning of the 20th century, the reformist ulema
Ibnou Zakri stood up against the archaism of rural Islam in Kabylia, denouncing, in particular, the ignorance
of the Islamic law of inheritance. Unlike other radical reformers, however, he was convinced that any change
in the law had to be at least partly approved by the customary authorities. In the case of Kabylia, this meant
that the village zawaya (local council) had to evolve so as to gradually accommodate a more progressive,
and Islamic approach to women’s rights (Chachoua 2001: 180-187). As it was standing, the zawaya was the
"furnace of heresy" (Chachoua 2001: 176).
What we have oﬀered above is obviously suggestive evidence rather than a test of the theory. In order
to have a rigorous empirical test, one would need to disentangle the inﬂuence of the modern law on the
custom from other inﬂuences born of economic, demographic, and ecological changes (population growth
and increased market integration, in particular). This is extremely diﬃcult since it requires the occurrence
of a legal shock unaccompanied by other changes potentially aﬀecting the custom, as well as the availability
of relevant information about the pre- and post-shock situations.
4 Conclusion
The impact of reforms brought through the channel of modern state agencies has always been a central issue
in developing countries eager to transform their institutions and their people’s behavioral patterns so as
26to eﬀectively meet the pressing challenges of long-term economic growth and poverty reduction. There are
many well-known diﬃculties involved in a legalistic approach to change, in particular, people’s ignorance of
modern laws, manipulation of these by elites adept at using customary rules malevolently to acquire new,
oﬃcially recognized rights, or the lack of credibility of the new rules and low trust in the state’s enforcing
ability. In this paper, we have analyzed the issue from a diﬀerent point of view: one that stresses the
interaction between modern and customary rules. Assuming that people have a reasonably good knowledge
about the written law, the formal law, under certain conditions, may acts as a "outside anchor" that exerts
a "magnet eﬀect" on the custom in the sense of pushing it in the direction wished by the legislator. As a
result, even if the modern law is not resorted to in an explicit manner, the simple fact that it exists and that
people whose interests concur with its prescriptions can threaten to use it, might create a situation in which
its objectives are partly met.
As our model shows, how far modern legislation succeeds in causing the custom to evolve in a pro-
poor direction (understood in a wide sense allowing for any change that favours disadvantaged sections of
the population) crucially depends upon the incentives of the customary authorities to keeping their people
within the fold. These, in turn, depends on several factors: the social prestige derived by these authorities
from dispute adjudication, the cost of accessing the formal court system, the cost of exclusion from the life
of the community, the content and the degree of predictability of the statutory law, and the shape of the
distribution of outside options among the poor.
A pro-poor change in law might induce customary authorities to adapt the custom in the same direction,
yet never enough to prevent the proportion of poor people going to the formal court from rising. However,
under some conditions, the same change can actually make the customary authorities to turn more con-
servative. Also, as inequality (in the distribution of these opportunities) grows, the custom is expected to
become less favorable to the poor. Illustrations provided in the ﬁeld of land rights suggest that, together
with exogenous forces emanating from the broad economic/ecological environment, factors corresponding to
various parameters of our model seem, indeed, to play a major role in determining the evolution of customs
and recourse to modern judges.
Important factors that have led to a growing inﬂuence of the modern law, through induced evolution of
the custom in a pro-poor direction and a rising occurrence of litigations cases in the formal court system,
include (i) the falling cost of accessing the formal system thanks, in part, to the more active role of NGOs
and civil society movements, and (ii) the expansion of outside opportunities. Changes in the surrounding
circumstances that result in increased competition for land have an opposite eﬀect, however: they cause a
regressive shift in the custom.
Looking at those instances in which the formal law aims to change an established order that discriminates
against a particular section of the community, we are concerned with the eﬀect of a statutory law on the
27welfare of these individuals. Our model shows that a pro-poor legal reform has several distinct eﬀects on the
welfare of the poor and, although some of them clearly beneﬁt from the reform, some others - in particular,
those with worst outside options - are hurt as a result of diminished social beneﬁts from participation in
community life. This calls for a more balanced view of such reforms in traditional social settings: a moderate
pro-poor legislation may be more favourable to the intended beneﬁciaries as a whole than a radical reform.
Upon careful thinking, the fact that the custom remains quite alive in regions such as Sub-Saharan
Africa does not necessarily imply that the state is insuﬃciently strong. To the extent that the customary
law evolves under the impact of changes occurring not only in the broad economic and ecological environment
but also in the modern law, the state is not as ineﬀective as it appears to be. A stronger state may even be
counter-productive if it tries to impose radical legal reforms through legislative ﬁat. By allowing the modern
statutory law to remain optional, the state exerts its inﬂuence through an indirect channel. This is possibly
a suitable path of institutional development in countries where the custom remains strong.
5 Appendix A
Proof. of Proposition 1: Denote with ω(n,v,Λ) and nss (v,Λ) the corresponding functions deﬁned in section
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We can show that ∂nss
∂c > 012. Therefore, for h′ (.) ≤ 0, Y ′′ ≤ 0, we have ∂Φ
∂c (v,Λ) ≤ 0.
12The function nss (v,Λ) satisﬁes the following identity:
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Since X′′ (.) ≤ 0, the expression in (8) is non-positive; i.e. the cross-partial w.r.t.. v and c in the maximand
is non-positive. Then, using Topkis’s theorem, we have that ˆ vM is decreasing in c.
In the special case where h′(ω) = 0 (uniform distribution), ∂Φ
∂c is negative so that (8) is comprised of two
negative terms and is therefore unambiguously negative.
Similarly, we can show that ∂Φ
∂f ≥ 0 and ∂Φ
∂φ ≤ 0. Applying Topkis’s theorem again, we obtain ˆ vM is
increasing in f and decreasing in φ.
(ii) If h′ (.) > 0 and Y ′′ is suﬃciently small, ∂Φ
∂c (n,v,Λ) ≥ 0. Then, for X′′ (.) suﬃciently small, the
expression in (8) is greater than or equal to zero. Therefore, Topkis’s theorem implies that ˆ vM is increasing
in c. Similarly, we can show that ∂Φ
∂f (n,v,Λ) ≤ 0 and ∂Φ
∂φ (n,v,Λ) ≥ 0. Therefore, ˆ vM is decreasing in f and
increasing in φ.
(iii) Let v1 be the value of the custom that maximizes the utility of the informal judge, and n1 the resulting
size of the community, in steady-state, when the formal system is described by the parameters Λ1 = (c,f1,φ).
Let v2,n2 be the corresponding values when the formal system is described by the parameters Λ2 = (c,f2,φ).
Let’s show that, if f2 > f1, then we must have n2 < n1. We show this by contradiction: ﬁrst, deﬁne the
functions v(n,Λ) and UM (n,Λ) as follows:
v(n,Λ) = min{v : H (ω(n,v,Λ)) = n} (9)
UM (n,Λ) = X (n) − g(v(n,Λ)). (10)
In other words, v(n,Λ) is the smallest value of the custom for which a fraction n of poor individuals in the
community would remain within the community in steady-state. UM (n,Λ) is the level of utility obtained by
the informal judge if his choice of the custom is such that the size of the community attained in steady-state
is n.
Note that, H (ω (n,v,Λ)) < n for each n > nss (otherwise, the steady-state would be reached before the community shrinks
to size nss). Therefore, we have
lim
δ− →0+










H (ω (n,v,Λ)) < 1
i.e. 1 − h(ω (n,v,Λ))
∂ω
∂nss > 0
Also, from the deﬁnition of ω (n,v,Λ), ∂ω
∂c > 0. Hence, we have ∂nss
∂c > 0.
29Suppose n2 ≥ n1. By the fundamental theorem of calculus,



















However, v(n,Λ1) < v(n,Λ2).13 Thus, if g′′ ≥ 0, then g′ (v(n,Λ2)) ≥ g′ (v (n,Λ1)). Also, Φ(v(n,Λ1),Λ1) >
Φ(v(n,Λ2),Λ2)14 and ∂v
∂n (n,Λ1) < ∂v





UM (n,Λ1)dn > 0





UM (n,Λ1)dn > UM (n1,Λ1)
=⇒ UM (n2,Λ1) > UM (n1,Λ1),
which contradicts the assumption that when the formal system is described by Λ1, and the informal judge
chooses the custom to maximize his steady-state utility, the steady-state is reached for a community size of
n1. We must have then n2 ≤ n1. Therefore, the steady-state size of the community nss is decreasing in f.
Through similar reasoning, we can show that nss is increasing in c and decreasing in φ.





Y ′ (ˆ nss) + ˆ nssY ′′ (ˆ nss) + δ
￿
u′ ￿


















13>From the deﬁnition of ω (n,v,Λ), we have ω (n,v,Λ2) < ω (n,v,Λ1). Therefore,
H (ω (n,v (n,Λ1),Λ2)) < H (ω (n,v (n,Λ1),Λ1))
Then, using (9), we have v (n,Λ2) > v (n,Λ1).
14We have
h(ω (n,v (n,Λ1),Λ1))u′ (v (n,Λ1))
1 − h(ω (n,v (n,Λ1),Λ1))Y ′ (n)
>
h(ω (n,v (n,Λ2),Λ2))u′ (v (n,Λ2))
1 − h(ω (n,v (n,Λ2),Λ2))Y ′ (n)
since
ω (n,v (n,Λ1),Λ1) = ω (n,v (n,Λ2),Λ2)
and v (n,Λ1) < v (n,Λ2). Therefore,
Φ(v (n,Λ1),Λ1) > Φ(v (n,Λ2),Λ2).
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30>From the deﬁnition of ˆ nss, we have dˆ nss
df =
1−h(ˆ ω(Λ))Y ′(ˆ nss)
h(ˆ ω(Λ))
￿
u′(ˆ vM) dˆ vM
d f −Eu′(vF)
￿ 16. Substituting for dˆ nss
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= 0. Then, the expression in (13) is positive if
ˆ nssY ′′ (ˆ nss)
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> 1 + δ
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< 1 + δ
￿
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Note that, in the steady-state, h(ˆ ω (Λ))Y ′ (ˆ nss) < 117. Therefore, if the elasticity of the marginal beneﬁt of
being part of the community with respect to its size is below 1, the expression in (??) is positive. Thus, the
welfare maximization problem is globally convex and the problem always has a corner solution. Therefore,
either abiding by the custom or carrying out a radical reform dominates a moderate reform in the formal
law.
16By deﬁntion, ˆ nss satisﬁes the following equation:
H (ω (ˆ nss, ˆ vss (Λ),Λ)) ≡ ˆ nss






































1 − h(ω (.))Y ′ (ˆ nss)
h(ω (.))
￿
u′ (ˆ vM) dˆ vM
df − Eu′ (vF)
￿
Since ˆ ω (Λ) = ω (ˆ nss, ˆ vss (Λ),Λ), we have
ˆ ω (Λ) =
1 − h(ˆ ω (Λ))Y ′ (ˆ nss)
h(ˆ ω (Λ))
￿
u′ (ˆ vM) dˆ vM
d f − Eu′ (vF)
￿
17As shown above, in the steady-state, h(ω (nss,v,Λ))Y ′ (nss) < 1. Since h(ˆ ω (Λ)) = ω
￿
nss, ˆ vM (Λ),Λ
￿
and ˆ nss (Λ) =
nss (v,Λ). Therefore, h(ˆ ω (Λ))Y ′ (ˆ nss) < 1.
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Therefore, given c,φ, the welfare maximization problem is globally concave if the condition in (14) is satisﬁed
for each possible value of f. If this problem has an interior solution, then it implies that a moderate reform
would dominate either abiding by the custom or carrying out a radical reform.
Proof. of Proposition 3: Deﬁne the function G : [0,1] × {1,2}  −→ [0,1] such that G(ω,1) = H1 (ω) and
G(ω,2) = H2 (ω).
Let ˜ n(v,s) be deﬁned as follows:
˜ n(v,s) = max{n : G(ω(n,v),s) = n} (15)
(for the sake of legibility, we suppress the parameters Λ). Then, it is possible to show that, for X′′,Y ′′ ≈ 0,
if
H′
2 (ω (˜ n(v,2),v)) > H′
1 (ω(˜ n(v,1),v)) (16)
then the expression X (˜ n(v,2)) − X (˜ n(v,1)) is increasing in v.18
Therefore, the function
V M (v,s) = X (n(v,s)) − g (v) (18)
exhibits ‘increasing diﬀerences’ in v,s as deﬁned by Topkis (1978) over its domain [0,1] × {1,2} if the
condition in (16) is satisﬁed for v ∈ [0,1]. Let ˜ v(s) be the value of v at which the expression (18) attains
its maximum. Then, applying Topkis’ theorem, ˜ v(2) > ˜ v(1). Similarly, we can show that ˜ v(2) < ˜ v(1) if
H′
2 (ω (n(v,2),v)) < H′
1 (ω(n(v,1),v)) for v ∈ [0,1].
6 Appendix B
In this appendix, we investigate the behavior of a forward-looking individual in the community; i.e. a
disputant who takes into account future gains and losses when deciding whether or not to appeal to the














s (ω (˜ n(v,s),v)) − Y ′ (˜ n(v,s))
Since Y ′′ ≈ 0, we have Y ′ (˜ n(v,1)) ≈ Y ′ (˜ n(v,2)). Thus, given H′
2 (ω (˜ n(v,2),v)) > H′
1 (ω (˜ n(v,1),v)), we obtain ∂˜ n
∂v (v,2) <
∂˜ n
∂v (v,1). SInce X′′ ≈ 0, we have X′ (˜ n(v,1)) ≈ X′ (˜ n(v,2)). Therefore, we can conclude that the expression in (17) is greater
than zero.
32formal court today. Consider a poor individual with outside option ω who faces a dispute in the current
period. Suppose that the custom provides a higher current utility than exiting the community. That is,
Y (n) + u
￿
vM￿




Then, like the myopic agent, the forward-looking agent would choose to remain in the community. That is
because he can enjoy the current beneﬁts of remaining in the community today and opt out at a later date
if he ﬁnds it advantageous to do so.
Now suppose that the custom provides a lower current utility than exiting the community:
Y (n) + u
￿
vM￿




The size of the community can only decrease over time, because community members can exit while no new
members can join in. Therefore, the expected per-period utility in future periods from remaining in the
community can be no larger than Y (n)+δu
￿
vM￿
, where δ is the probability of being embroiled in a dispute
in any future period. On the other hand, the expected per-period utility in future periods from leaving the







. For δ suﬃciently close to 1, the condition in (19) implies that
Y (n) + δu
￿
vM￿








In this case, the forward-looking agent would leave the community whenever the formal legal system provides
a higher payoﬀ in the current period than the custom. Combining the two results above, we conclude that
a forward-looking agent would behave exactly in the same way as a myopic agent for δ close to 1.
The remaining case we need to investigate is where (19) holds but δ is suﬃciently low such that (20)
is violated. This implies, in particular that Y (n) > ω. Then an individual with outside option ω may
choose to remain in the community in the current period because of the beneﬁts of the community-level
public good. Clearly, raising ω increases the expected utility from exiting the community both in the current




a forward-looking individual would be indiﬀerent between appealing to the formal court in the current period






. Raising n or vM




is increasing in both n and vM.
In summary, for δ suﬃciently close to 1, the threshold value at which the forward-looking agent leaves the
community is the same as that for the myopic agent. For δ small, the threshold value for the forward-looking
agent is higher than that for the myopic agent. In either case, the threshold value is increasing in n and
vM. Therefore, the equilibria we obtain for forward-looking agents is qualitatively similar to that obtained
for myopic agents.
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